



Ärendetyp: 6

Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 8353ci

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1 Executive Summary

The TOE is the hardware and the firmware of the following multifunction printer (MFP) models with hard disk and with FAX:

KYOCERA TASKalfa 8353ci, TASKalfa 8353ciG, TASKalfa 7353ci

Copystar CS 8353ci, CS 7353ci

Triumph-Adler/UTAX 8307ci, 7307ci

with the following firmware:

System firmware: 2XN_S0IS.C01.011

FAX firmware: 3R2_5100.003.012

In the evaluated configuration, the optional fax board is installed and is included in the scope of the TOE.

The TOE provides copying, scanning, printing, faxing and boxing functionality. Delivery is done by means of a courier trused by KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc. Installation and initial setup is done by a representative KYOCERA or the approved reseller.

The ST claims demonstrble conformance to the Protection Profile (PP):

IEEE Std 2600.2 2009; "2600.2 PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices,

Operational Environment B" v 1.0 including the PRT, SCN, CPY, FAX,

DSR, and SMI packages. (in accordance with NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20)

The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB, in their premises in Bromma and Sundbyberg, Sweden and to some extent in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan, and was completed on the 18th of May 2020.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version 3.1 revision 5, and Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM), version 3.1 revision 5.

Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.

The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB.

The certification results only apply to the versions of the product indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification

Certification Identification			
Certification ID	CSEC 2019011		
Name and version of the	The multifunction printers:		
certified IT product	Kyocera TASKalfa8353ci, TASKalfa 8353ciG, TASKalfa 7353ci Copystar CS 8353ci, CS 7353ci Triumph-Adler/UTAX 8307ci, 7307ci with FAX System. System firmware: 2XN_S0IS.C01.011 FAX firmware: 3R2_5100.003.012		
Security Target Identification	TASKalfa 8353ci, TASKalfa 7353ci Series with FAX System Security Target		
EAL	EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2		
Sponsor	KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.		
Developer	KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.		
ITSEF	Combitech AB		
Common Criteria version	3.1 release 5		
CEM version	3.1 release 5		
QMS version	1.23.2		
Scheme Notes Release	14.0		
Recognition Scope	CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA		
Certification date	2020-06-03		

3 Security Policy

TOE provides the following security services:

- User Management
- Data Access Control
- Job Authorization
- HDD Encryption
- Overwrite-Erase
- Audit Log
- Security Management
- Self-Test
- Network Protection

3.1 User Management

A function that identifies and authenticates users so that only authorized users can use the TOE. When using the TOE from the Operation Panel and Client PCs, a user will be required to enter his/her login user name and login user password for identification and authentication. The User Management Function includes a User Account Lockout Function, which prohibits the users access for a certain period of time if the number of identification and authentication attempts consecutively result in failure, a function, which protects feedback on input of login user password when performing identification and authentication and a function, which automatically logouts in case no operation has been done for a certain period of time.

3.2 Data Access Control

A function that restricts access to protected assets so that only authorized users can access to the protected assets inside the TOE.

The following types of Access Control Functions are available.

- Access Control Function to control access to image data
- Access Control Function to control access to job data

3.3 Job Authorization

A function that restricts usage of the function so that only authorized persons can use basic functions of the TOE .

The following types of Job Authorization are available.

- Copy Job (Copy Function)
- Print Job (Print Function)
- Send Job (Scan to Send Function)
- FAX Send Job (FAX Function)
- FAX Reception Job (FAX Function)
- Storing Job (Box Function)
- Network Job (Network Protection Function)

3.4 HDD Encryption

A function that encrypts information assets stored in the HDD in order to prevent leakage of data stored in the HDD inside the TOE.

3.5 Overwrite-Erase

A function that does not only logically delete the management information of the image data, but also entirely overwrites and erases the actual data area so that it disables re-usage of the data where image data that was created on the HDD or the Flash Memory during usage of the basic functions of the TOE.

3.6 Audit Log

A function that records and stores the audit logs of user operations and securityrelevant events on the HDD. This function provides the audit trails of TOE use and security-relevant events. Stored audit logs can be accessed only by a device administrator. The stored audit logs will be sent by email to the destination set by the device administrator.

3.7 Security Management

A function that sets security functions of the TOE. This function can be used only by authorized users. This function can be utilized from an Operation Panel and a Client PC. Operations from a Client PC use a web browser.

3.8 Self-Test

A function that verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data to detect unauthorized alteration of the executable code of the TOE security functions.

3.9 Network Protection

A function that protects communication paths to prevent leaking and altering of data by eavesdropping of data in transition over the internal network connected to TOE.

This function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to and protects targeted information assets by encryption, when using a Scan to Send Function, a Print Function, a Box Function and a BOX Function from a Client PC (web browser), or a Security Management Function from a Client PC (web browser). However, usage of a Print Function directly connected to a MFP is exception.

This function also provides a feature to prevent forwarding of information from an external interface to an internal network through TOE without permission.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

4.1 Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage and the operational environment of the TOE.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED

The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.

A.USER.TRAINING

TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRUST

Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

4.2 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target contains six threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

T.DOC.DIS

User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

T.DOC.ALT

User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.FUNC.ALT

User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.PROT.ALT

TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

T.CONF.DIS

TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

T.CONF.ALT

TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

The Security Target contains five Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have been considered during the evaluation.

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION

To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

P.AUDIT.LOGGING


To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT

To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.

P.HDD.ENCRYPTION

To improve the confidentiality of the documents, User Data and TSF Data stored in HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.



Architectural Information

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Figure 1, Physical configuration of the TOE

The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main Board, a FAX Board, HDD and SSD hardware, and firmwares.

The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of input by the TOE user. The Scanner Unit and the Printer Unit are the hardware that input document into MFP and output as printed material.

A Main Board is the circuit board to control entire TOE. A system firmware is installed on a SSD, which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a Network Interface and a Local Interface (USB Port).

The ASIC that is also on the Main Board includes a Security Chip, which shares installation of some of the security functions.

The Security Chip realizes security arithmetic processing for HDD encryption function and HDD Overwrite-Erase function.

A FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the PROM, which is positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, a FAX Board has a network control unit as an interface.

6 Documentation

For proper configuration into the evaluated configuration, the following guidance documents are available:

Notice

FAX System 12(X) Installation Guide

TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci First Steps Quick Guide

TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci Operation Guide

FAX System 12(X) Operation Guide

Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide

Command Center RX User Guide

TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci Printer Driver User Guide

KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide

7 IT Product Testing

7.1 Developer Testing

The developer performed extensive manual tests on the following printer model: KYOCERA TASKalfa 8353ci with

System Firmware 2XN_S0IS.C01.011

FAX Firmware 3R2_5100.003.012

Since the TSF and its execution environment are the same in the models in the 8353ci ans 7353ci families, this covers all of the TOE models.

The developer's testing covered the security functional behaviour of all TSFIs and most SFRs. Some gaps in the SFR coverage were identified and covered by evaluator independent testing. All test results were as expected.

The testing was performed in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan.

7.2 Evaluator Testing

The evaluator performed the tests on the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan, using the same test environment as the developer.

The evaluator verified a sample of developer tests and performed independent testing adding to the test coverage.

7.3 Penetration Testing

The evaluators penetration tested the TOE using the same test environment as for the independent testing, in Osaka, Japan. The following types of penetration testing were performed:

- Port scans, using NMAP
- Vulnerability scan including web application vulnerability scan, using Nessus
- JPG fuzzing, using Peach fuzzer

All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.

8 Evaluated Configuration

In the TOE operational environment, the following non-TOE hardware, and software is expected:

Client PC with KX printer driver, Kyocera TWAIN driver, and web browser

Mail server connected via IPSec (IKE 1)

FTP server connected via IPSec (IKE 1)

In the evaluated configuration:

- The optional faxboard is installed and is included in the scope of the TOE.
- local authentication should be selected LDAP authentication servers should not be used
- maintenance interfaces shall not be accessible
- expanding functionality by installing Java applications is not allowed

9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name	Short name (includ- ing component iden- tifier for assurance families)	Verdict
Security Target Evaluation	ASE	PASS
ST Introduction	ASE_INT.1	PASS
Conformance claims	ASE_CCL.1	PASS
Security Problem Definition	ASE_SPD.1	PASS
Security objectives	ASE_OBJ.2	PASS
Extended components definition	ASE_ECD.1	PASS
Derived security requirements	ASE_REQ.2	PASS
TOE summary specification	ASE_TSS.1	PASS
Life-cycle support	ALC	PASS
Use of a CM system	ALC_CMC.2	PASS
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage	ALC_CMS.2	PASS
Delivery procedures	ALC_DEL.1	PASS
Flaw reporting procedures	ALC FLR.2	PASS
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Development	ADV	PASS
Security architecture description	ADV_ARC.1	PASS
Security-enforcing functional specification	ADV_FSP.2	PASS
Basic design	ADV_TDS.1	PASS
6	-	
Guidance documents	AGD	PASS
Operational user guidance	AGD_OPE.1	PASS
Preparative procedures	AGD PRE.1	PASS
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Tests	ATE	PASS
Evidence of coverage	ATE_COV.1	PASS
Functional testing	ATE_FUN.1	PASS
Independent testing - sample	ATE_IND.2	PASS
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Vulnerability Assessment	AVA	PASS
Vulnerability analysis	AVA_VAN.2	PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations None.

11 Glossary

CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document describing the methodology used in Common Cri- teria evaluations
СМ	Configuration Management
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
ISO	International Organization for Stan- dardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to operate within an evaluation and certification scheme
LAN	Local Area Network
MFP	Multi-Function Printer
NCU	Network Control Unit
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
SMTP	Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SSD	Solid State Disk
ST	Security Target, document contain- ing security requirements and speci- fications, used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface

12 Bibliography

ST102	TASKalfa 8353ci, TASKalfa 7353ci Series with FAX System Security Target, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 1.02, 2019-05-18, 19FMV3558-34
QG	TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci First Steps Quick Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 302XN5601001, June 2019, 19FMV3558-34
IG-FAX	FAX System 12 Installation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 303RK5671101, August 2019, 19FMV3558-34
OG	TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci Operation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 2XNKDEN000, June 2019, 19FMV3558-34
OG-FAX	FAX System 12 Operation Guide TASKalfa 508ci TASKalfa 408ci TASKalfa 358ci, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document Version 3RKKDEN301, October 2019, 19FMV3558-34
DE	Data Encryption/Overwrite, Operation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 3MS2XTGEEN1, December 2019, 19FMV3558-34
PD	TASKalfa 8353ci / TASKalfa 7353ci Printer Driver User Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 2XNCLKTEN740, July 2019, 19FMV3558-34
CCRX	User Guide, Command Center RX, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version CCRXKDEN18, April 2019, 19FMV3558-34
Notice	Notice, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 302XT5641001, January 2020, 19FMV3558-34
NDP	KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide, Kyocera Document Solu- tions Inc., document version DirectPrintKDEN2, February 2019, 19FMV3558-34
PP2600B	2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B, IEEE, document version 1.0, June 2009
CCpart1	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,

Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001

CCpart2	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC	CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
SP-002	SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document version 31.0

Appendix A Scheme Versions

During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme and Scheme Notes have been used.

A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System

Version	Introduced	Impact of changes
1.23.2	2020-05-11	None
1.23.1	2020-03-06	None
1.23	2019-10-14	None
1.22.3	Application	Original version

A.2 Scheme Notes

Scheme Note	Version	Title	Applicability
SN-15	3.0	Demonstration of test coverage	Clarify demonstration of test cover- age at EAL2: evaluator + developer tests together provide full coverage of the TSFI.
SN-18	1.0	Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target	Clarifications on the content of the ST.
SN-22	1.0	Vulnerability Assessment	Vulnerability assessment needs to be redone if 30 days or more has passed between AVA and the final version of the final evaluation re- port.